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The non-identity problem in climate ethics: 
A restatement
by Jasmina Nedevska 
Climate change litigation
In the case California v. BP, the cities of Oakland and San Fran-
cisco (“the Cities”) turned to the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California, filing a lawsuit against BP and 
four other energy companies: Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Exxon 
and Royal Dutch Shell. Collectively, these companies are respon-
sible for over 11% of the accumulated pollution of carbon dioxide 
and methane since the Industrial Revolution; they are also deemed 
the world’s five largest fossil fuel producers at present. According 
to the plaintiffs, the energy companies should be held liable for a 
continued marketing of fossil fuels long after learning that such 
fuels contribute to climate change. The Cities required, in this 
vein, that the companies be directed to fund a programme to build 
sea walls and other infrastructure to protect persons and property 
from global warming-induced harm (Seinfeld 2018: 25, 28).
District Judge William H. Alsup did not consider the case a mat-
ter for state courts and dismissed it for this reason. At first glance, 
this simply means that the case will be tried within the US federal 
court system instead. However, the crucial criterion for Judge Al-
sup concerned the applicability of a concept of harm. “For a court 
to exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant,” 
the judge reasoned, pointing to precedent, “the claim must be 
one which ‘arises out of or relates to’ the defendant’s forum related 
activities” (California v. BP 2018: 5). This means that if the Court 
of California is to judge in the case involving the energy compa-
nies, the residents of the Cities must show that climate change (or 
their own climate change-related needs) “arises out of or relates 
to” the companies’ marketing of fossil fuels in California.
The Cities here pointed to “significant activities of defendants’ 
 alleged agents and subsidiaries – such as the transportation and sale 
of gas to California consumers – which amount to the purposeful 
direction of activities towards the forum.” Alsup observed, however, 
that it is “manifest that global warming would have continued in 
the absence of all California-related activities of defendants. Plain-
tiffs have therefore failed to adequately link each defendants’ [sic] 
alleged California activities to plaintiffs’ harm” (California v. BP 
2018: 5). The plaintiffs’ problem was not that they needed to show 
that the relevant companies alone gave rise to global warming. In-
stead, the Cities were required to show that the companies’ conduct 
is a “but for” cause of their harm. Alsup argued further: “nowhere 
do plaintiffs assert that sea rise would not have occurred had any de-
fendant reduced or refrained from fossil fuel production in Califor-
nia (or elsewhere in the United States)” (California v. BP 2018: 7).
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This article justifies and restates the non-identity problem (NIP) 
in relation to climate change. Some climate ethicists who engage 
with the NIP assume that the problem is an obstacle to convinc-
ing people to live by intergenerational climate duties. The idea 
seems to be that calls for long-term climate measures lose force if 
the argument does not fully stand up to scrutiny. Others, howev-
er, point out that the NIP, being a purely philosophical problem, 
has no implications for individual moral practice or common 
 policy. Indeed, the latter theorists claim, treating the problem as 
if it had such implications is counterproductive (Tremmel 2018).
My point of departure occupies a middle ground. While there 
is often good reason to set the NIP aside in practical politics, 
there can be unforeseen and/or delimited areas where a climate 
NIP (C-NIP) will have practical implications. As I argue below, a 
 recent case of climate change litigation may serve as an instructive 
example.
The purpose of this article is to facilitate further discussion, 
among climate ethicists and others, on the components and 
 possible  implications of the non-identity problem. The paper is 
structured as follows.
In the upcoming section, I describe how an established concept of 
harm, and its inapplicability, had significant impact on the judge’s 
reasoning in the case California vs. BP (2018). With regard to 
future people, I argue, a similar inapplicability could stem from 
non-identity.
Thereafter, I describe how the circumstances of a climate NIP will 
often differ from the more established NIP in bioethics. I identify 
three important differences, regarding interaction, numbers, and 
agency, respectively. Because of these differences, a climate NIP 
can be seen as more difficult to handle.
Finally, I map out and discuss the premises and conclusion of the 
NIP in a climate version, modifying an account in bioethics by 
David Boonin (2014). Following Tremmel (2018), I refer to this 
problem as the Climate-NIP (C-NIP for short). 
A
While there is often good reason to set the NIP aside 
in practical politics, there can be unforeseen and/or 





This is not the same problem as the non-identity problem. The ex-
ample raises questions regarding imperceptible consequences and 
collective action. The non-identity problem, on the other hand, 
is not fundamentally due to our incapacity to consider small con-
tributions to harm but to future persons’ lack of fixed identities. 
However, the example goes to show that philosophical obstacles 
to apply a concept of harm may matter in practice and with regard 
to climate change. Further, non-identity seems to have a simi-
lar implication as the collective action in the example above: it 
renders an established notion of harm inapplicable. Hence, given 
that a court case concerns distant future people, non-identity may 
affect, for instance, which forum and what verdicts we can expect. 
Below, I briefly introduce the non-identity problem.
The non-identity problem
The philosophical problem referred to as the non-identity prob-
lem seems to show that there are no intergenerational duties with 
regard to the climate. 
The problem was identified by an increasing number of scholars 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In Reasons and Persons (1984), 
Derek Parfit would give the problem a thorough and influential 
treatment. A basic observation made by the non-identity scholars 
is that personal identity depends on by whom and when a person 
is conceived. In turn, who meets whom and when procreation 
takes place depend on a countless number of actions, including 
a society’s choice to live sustainably or not. Future persons can-
not, therefore, be rendered worse off by our unsustainable living. 
Rather, the particular people who will exist in the future will do 
so as a result of how we decide to live our lives. Moral theory, as 
well as common sense, typically relies on person-affecting reasons 
– an act is seen as being morally wrong if it renders another person 
worse off in some way. In this case, however, such a person-af-
fecting view seems to imply, counterintuitively, that it would not 
be morally wrong to leave behind an unsustainable climate. This 
would mean that there are no intergenerational climate duties.
Future people’s non-identity, many scholars insist, should make no 
difference to our judgement in this and similar cases. For around 
four decades, various moral arguments have, therefore, been tried 
as an objection to intergenerational wrongs. Some scholars aim to 
keep a person-affecting view in these efforts. Others consciously as-
sume an alternative, impersonal view. Predominantly, attempts of 
the latter sort have been utilitarian in character. According to util-
itarianism, the right act is the one that produces the most well-be-
ing, summed impersonally across all the people affected. This sort 
of approach can likewise lead to counterintuitive conclusions, in-
cluding the so-called repugnant conclusion, given that different 
acts also produce different numbers of people (Parfit 1984: ch. 17). 
So far, no suggestion of how to approach non-identity seems to be 
considered perfect. Using Parfit’s expression, we are still looking 
for “Theory X”. Theory X would solve the non-identity problem or 
circumvent the non-identity problem without running into other 
problems, such as the repugnant conclusion.
While some dismiss the practical relevance of the problem, typi-
cally in connection to climate change, I have here suggested 
that there is reason to take the non-identity problem into some 
 account with regard to the climate. In the following, I provide a 
more detailed restatement of the non-identity problem in relation 
to climate change.
The circumstances of the C-NIP
In the upcoming sections, I identify particular circumstances that 
will often set the C-NIP apart from a more discussed version in 
bioethics. First, however, we shall understand the more estab-
lished version of the non-identity problem better.
Consider the frequently employed and recast example of Parfit’s, 
referred to as the “14-year-old girl”. The 14-year-old is assumed to 
want a child; she is not yet pregnant but wishes to conceive. The 
girl is told she should wait and have the child later: “that would 
be better for him,” her close ones claim, “since you would be able 
to give him a better start in life” (Parfit 2011: 220). Nonetheless, 
she goes ahead and has a child, and gives him a bad start in life.
Can we uphold, the non-identity literature asks, that she did an-
ything wrong? Stipulate further that neither the young mother 
herself nor the rest of society suffers from the decision. Although 
we may still want to say that she did something wrong vis-à-vis 
her child, we do not seem to be in a position to claim that her de-
cision was in fact worse for her child. A reason behind this is that 
the child’s very identity depends on when he was conceived. “If 
[the 14-year-old] had waited,” Parfit points out, “this particular 
child would never have existed. And, despite its bad start, his life 
is worth living” (Parfit 1984: 359). Since the child is not worse off 
than he would otherwise have been, it is hard to say that he has 
been harmed by his mother’s act. It then proves to be difficult to 
say that the 14-year-old did anything wrong or even objectionable 
with regard to how her child’s life turned out.
The non-identity problem is conceived of as a problem because 
person-affecting assumptions, which many hold to be true, bring 
one to a conclusion that seems false. In order to account coherent-
ly for intergenerational climate duties, one would need to show 
that one can deal with this problem. In one way or another, one 
will need to come up with an argument where identity makes no 
difference to the conclusion.
Below, I state some central respects in which the climate case 
 differs from that of the 14-year-old girl. The differences shed 
light on particular requirements that climate change puts on an 
 account of intergenerational duties.
Parfit refers to a related example as “risky policy”. We could here 
think of the risky policy as high emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHG), which cause climate change. This may convey rising sea 
levels, extreme weather phenomena or other dangerous events, of 
which some will happen in a distant future. These are events we 
see as harmful if or when they strike contemporary people. There 
is a risk, in this case, that a future catastrophe or degradation will 
have a negative effect on the quality of future people’s lives. At 
the same time, society’s choice to emit GHG for various purposes 
Philosophical obstacles to apply a concept of harm may 
matter in practice and with regard to climate change. 
[G]iven that a court case concerns distant future people, 
non-identity may affect, for instance, which forum and 
what verdicts we can expect.
In important respects, the climate case may differ from 
the case of the 14-year-old. I bring up three possible 





also affects to some extent who will live in the (further) future. We 
thus seem unable to say that the future persons whose living con-
ditions will be affected negatively by high emissions will thereby 
be made worse off. Our prima facie inability to appeal to a notion 
of harm thus makes the environmental case similar to that of the 
14-year-old girl.
Yet, in important respects, the climate case may differ from the 
case of the 14-year-old. I bring up three possible differences here, 
regarding interaction, numbers, and agency, respectively.
Interaction
First, the present generation will experience no interaction with 
the future generation concerned. The choice of the 14-year-old 
has been described as a “direct” case, as her choice “directly deter-
mines which particular person will exist after the choice is made” 
(Boonin 2014: 5). Contributing to climate change, on the other 
hand, has been described as an “indirect” case, in which a choice is 
part of “a complex chain of events that eventually have an equally 
decisive effect on which particular people exist after the choice is 
made” (Boonin 2014: 5). This is connected to the fact that climate 
change is caused by a collective agent, or the joint behaviour of 
many individual agents, to which I return below. But the causal 
complexity also removes the possible object of duty from imme-
diate consideration. While the 14-year-old’s choice concerns an 
immediate descendant who is likely to interact with her at some 
point, many of those who in the climate case would come to ex-
perience a degraded environment are distant descendants whose 
lives will have no effect on us or our present societies. It could be 
argued that less or no interaction characterises the relationship 
between many contemporaries who are distant from one another 
in space. Yet, with regard to distant future people, our interac-
tion with them is not minimal but non-existent; it is not an open 
 possibility but impossible.
With regard to interaction, the climate case can be understood 
as a more difficult case than that of the 14-year-old. For exam-
ple, approaches to the non-identity problem that appeal to special 
 duties given parent-child interaction may not apply here (Boonin 
2014: 7). With regard to the C-NIP, it is thus particularly impor-
tant that the account should hold true in a case with no inter-
action between present and future people.
Numbers
Second, the future people in the climate case are not stable in 
terms of numbers. We know that ordinary choices (without the 
feature of non-identity) are choices concerning the same people 
and that, on the contrary, the options of the 14-year-old yield 
different persons. Yet, it is commonly assumed that the 14-year-
old will either conceive one person now or one person later. In 
the climate case, on the other hand, it is likely that different ways 
of structuring society will also yield different numbers of people. 
Given different scenarios, we can often estimate future numbers 
of people. The choice of the 14-year-old is thus a simple “different 
people choice”, while inducing climate change is, in addition, a 
“different number choice”. The two cases could be depicted so 
that they do not differ in this way. Yet, a typical climate case will 
require that an account of intergenerational duties holds true re-
gardless of how many people are estimated to live in future sce-
narios, while the typical bioethics case does not raise this issue 
(Parfit 2010).
Agency
Third, the climate case expounded here can be described as one 
of collective agency. We are faced with many individual acts that 
– taken together – cause detrimental global warming. It has been 
argued that removing or adding one separate individual act does 
not make any difference at all to the outcome (Sinnott-Arm-
strong 2005; Maltais 2013; Kingston/Sinnott-Armstrong 2018). 
An implication of this would be that these individual acts cannot 
possibly be described as being morally wrong. In turn, whether 
and how a collective act in general, or a collective act of emitting 
greenhouse gases in particular, can or should be described as 
in itself intentional and thus subject to moral scrutiny is an 
 ongoing discussion in the social sciences (List/Pettit, 2013, 2006; 
O’Madagain 2012). It might be that there is no act there that 
can be subject to moral scrutiny, and if there is, it is not clear if 
and how we should use conventional resources in moral theory 
to evaluate such an act. The C-NIP may thus require that one 
 addresses questions of collective action (which arose independently 
in the climate litigation case above).
Restating the C-NIP
In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, a practical intuition 
stated to give rise to the non-identity problem is the intuition that 
“the existence-inducing acts under scrutiny in the various non-
identity cases are in fact wrong” (Roberts 2015). In a fairly recent 
book, which appears to be the most comprehensive overview of 
the non-identity literature so far, David Boonin (2014: 3-5) simi-
larly describes the efforts to deal with the non-identity problem in 
terms of accounting for a moral wrong. 
It is worth noting that there are other relevant conclusions we 
may want to draw. More modestly, we could want to account 
for the intuition that future people’s climate matters (at all). A 
bolder conclusion would be that a nation state (or other political 
entities) may legitimately act to safeguard future people’s climate 
(Nedevska 2018).
Yet, a moral wrongdoing intuition appears to be the most com-
mon one for non-identity scholars to take on. I will here speak of 
C-NIP in a similar manner. I shall wish to account for the intui-
tion that leaving future generations with an unsustainable climate is 
morally wrong, and describe the difficulties to do so in more detail.
A starting point for a detailed formulation of any version of the 
non-identity problem is Parfit’s “time-dependence claim”. He 
states that “[i]f any particular person had not been conceived 
when he was in fact conceived, it is in fact true that he would 
never have existed” (Parfit 1984: 351, emphasis in original). This, 
While the 14-year-old’s choice concerns an immediate 
descendant who is likely to interact with her at some 
point, those who in the climate case would come 
to  experience a degraded environment are distant 
 descendants whose lives will have no effect on us or  
our present societies.
The choice of the 14-year-old is thus a simple “different 
people choice”, while inducing climate change is, in 




in turn, has the strange implication that “lowering the quality of 
life might be worse for no one”. Parfit argues: 
“Suppose that we are choosing between two social or economic pol-
icies. And suppose that, on one of the two policies, the standard of 
living would be slightly higher over the next century. This effect 
implies another. It is not true that, whichever policy we choose, 
the same particular people will exist in the further future. Given 
these effects of two such policies on the details of our lives, it would 
increasingly over time be true that, on the different policies, people 
married different people. And, even in the same marriages, the chil-
dren would increasingly over time be conceived at different times. 
As I have argued, children conceived [at different times] would in 
fact be different children. Since the choice between our two policies 
would affect the timing of later conceptions, some of the people who 
are later born would owe their existence to our choice of one of 
the two policies. If we had chosen the other policy, these particular 
people would never have existed.” (Parfit 1984: 361)
The claim is not very controversial – as Parfit tells us, it is quite 
“easy to believe” (1984: 361). But believing this claim will have 
us accept the first in a series of premises that can lead to various 
counterintuitive conclusions. Boonin (2014) distinguishes five 
such premises, in a case similar to that of the 14-year-old girl – 
a woman who chooses under what circumstances to conceive. 
Here, I expound a partly similar (but in important respects differ-
ent) non-identity argument in a case regarding the emissions of 
GHG. The premises are based on common prima facie beliefs, and 
many would on reflection modify at least some of these. The argu-
ment is neither provided as perfectly sound, nor as representative 
of what most people would actually believe. The argument  allows 
us, rather, to categorise and test the assumptions of theories, 
 precisely as responses to the non-identity problem.
The first premise
Let us imagine a present generation facing the kind of choice de-
scribed by Parfit above. Let us assume that the members of this 
generation must choose whether to keep emitting high levels of 
GHG or to lower their emissions. If they choose High Emissions, 
this will destabilise the Earth’s ecosystems in a long-term per-
spective. We may refer to the present population as Generation 
One (G1). The choice of High Emissions would grant G1 more 
material benefits, as compared to Low Emissions, which would 
bring about less material benefits within their lifetimes. If High 
Emissions is chosen, this will lead to an unsustainable climate. A 
generation in a later century, Generation Five (G5), will experi-
ence a significantly reduced quality of life due to, let us only say, 
a natural disaster. G5’s lives will remain worth living, but just 
barely. If, on the other hand, G1 chooses Low Emissions, this will 
(according to the time-dependence claim) yield a different set of 
people in the future. We may refer to this set as Generation Five* 
(G5*). These people’s environment will be sustainable, and they 
will not have to endure the disaster that would strike G5.
Assume that – aware of the risks – G1 still chooses High Emis-
sions. As a result of their choice, a natural disaster hits G5 and 
significantly reduces G5’s living standards. Many, if not most of 
us have the feeling that G1 did something morally wrong. Yet, the 
people belonging to G5 are not made worse off by G1’s choice of 
High Emissions (Boonin 2014: 3). If G1 had chosen Low Emis-
sions, the people of G5 would not have existed at all. Instead, 
there would have been G5*, an entirely different set of people.1 
Thus, although G5’s living standards have been reduced, they 
have not been made worse off than they would otherwise have 
been, had G1 not committed their act. We may then formulate a 
first premise in a non-identity argument as follows:
P1: Generation One’s act of High Emissions rather than Low Emis-
sions does not make the individuals of Generation Five worse off than 
they would otherwise have been.
The second and third premises
Rendering somebody worse off can be considered a “common 
sense” definition of harm.2 For an act to harm someone, many 
will say, it must make that person worse off than they would have 
been, had the act not been committed.3 We may here speak of P2, 
as follows.4 
P2: A’s act harms B only if A’s act makes B worse off than B would 
otherwise have been.
From these two premises alone, we are able to deduce that Gen-
eration One’s act of High Emissions rather than Low Emissions 
does not harm the individuals of Generation Five.
In order to describe the problem correctly, we will need to make a 
further stipulation at this point: that G1’s act does not harm any-
one other than G5. In many actual cases of environmental haz-
ards, the consequences are already faced by present generations. It 
could thus be argued that G1 harms (some of ) its own members. 
Yet, as Boonin argues, it is still reasonable to add this kind of stip-
ulation. When we are faced with the case of the natural disaster 
hitting G5, and think that G1 did something morally wrong, we 
do not ask ourselves whether the people of G1 also inflicted some 
harm on themselves (or require them to have done so in order to 
say that what they did was morally wrong). What we believe is 
that G1 did something morally wrong with regard to future peo-
ple, independently of whether G1 caused any harm to itself (cf. 
Boonin 2014: 4). That is the kind of intuition we are interested 
in here. We are interested in whether there are intergenerational 
climate wrongs; whether there are other kinds of climate wrongs 
is not our concern. This does not mean that we do not care about 
present people’s situation at all. It only means that, right now, we 
are theoretically interested in the intergenerational aspect of the 
climate case. So, we shall formulate, for the sake of enquiry, a 
third premise, P3.
P3: Generation One’s act of High Emissions rather than Low Emis-
sions does not harm anyone other than the individuals of Generation 
Five.
The fourth and fifth premises
The three premises hitherto accounted for entail that Generation 
One’s act of High Emissions rather than Low Emissions does not 
harm anyone.
At this point, Boonin would ask us to take into account a prin-
ciple that many people accept, at least at first glance, namely a 
moral “harm-principle”. His description of this thought is that, if 
an act harms no one, then the act is not morally wrong. Edward 
Page, for example, refers to an “intergenerational harms claim” 
where a High Emissions policy would be “wrong because it harms 
[L]eaving future generations with an unsustainable 




future persons” (Page 1999: 112). Roberts writes in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “an act can be wrong only if that act 
makes things worse for, or (we can say) harms, some existing or 
future person” (2015). Similarly to Boonin, we may break this 
principle down into two premises: the claim that, if an act harms 
no one, then the act does not wrong anyone, and the claim that, 
if an act does not wrong anyone, then it is not morally wrong (Cf. 
Boonin 2014: 4). First, that is, we get P4.
P4: If an act does not harm anyone, then the act does not wrong 
anyone.
This asserts that, if an act does not harm a particular person, then 
no one has a personal claim of being wronged.
We also get a premise saying that, if no particular person has such 
a claim, then the act is not morally wrong. We may formulate 
this as P5.
P5: If an act does not wrong anyone, then the act is not morally wrong.
The counter-intuitive conclusion
The five premises together bring us to our conclusion, C.
C: Generation One’s act of High Emissions rather than Low Emissions 
is not morally wrong.
Some have argued that the non-identity of future people is unnec-
essarily made out to be troublesome. It has been pointed out, for 
example, that we need not look to the future to find examples of 
duties to unidentifiable persons. Joel Feinberg has argued:
“We can tell, sometimes, that shadowy forms in the spatial distance 
belong to human beings, though we know not who or how many 
they are; and this imposes a duty on us not to throw bombs, for 
example, in their direction. In like manner, the vagueness of the 
human future does not weaken its claim on us in light of the nearly 
certain knowledge that it will, after all, be human.” (1981: 148). 
But we have now seen that future people’s non-identity can have 
serious moral implications. This non-identity could be described 
as ontological, instead of epistemological. Future persons are, in 
this regard, unidentifiable not because it is difficult to know or 
see who they are, but because they still lack identities altogether. 
Therefore their identities are also contingent on our actions over 
time. In the argument above, we have seen how this time-depend-
ence renders a common conception of harm inapplicable and 
forces us to draw a counterintuitive conclusion. Given the prem-
ises, a generation’s act of emitting high levels of GHG, rendering 
future people’s climate unsustainable, is not morally wrong.
Furthermore, the growing phenomenon of climate change liti-
gation shows that the inapplicability of a concept of harm can 
have practical implications. I initially discussed a case marked by 
a claim on behalf of present people, where the problem was one 
of collective action. But in cases involving future people, the in-
applicability of a concept of harm could stem from non-identity.
In the case discussed, Judge Alsup reasoned that since the defend-
ants’ activities in California (and elsewhere in the United States) 
had not made Californian citizens worse off than they would oth-
erwise have been (a factual observation analogous to P1), there is 
no causal link between the defendants’ actions and the plaintiffs’ 
alleged harm (the judge subscribing, thereby, to P2).
Other premises could deserve our particular attention: P4, which 
states that harming a particular person is the only way one could 
wrong him or her; and P5, which states that wronging particular 
persons is the only way one could commit morally wrongful acts.
In order to conclude, coherently, that an intergenerational wrong 
has been committed, either P1, P2, P4 or P5 needs to be convinc-
ingly rejected. If a judge accepts all five premises, it implies that 
a defendant cannot be said to wrong in relation to distant future 
generations.
Attention to the non-identity problem is thus warranted, not only 
for philosophical reasons but because these premises may play a 
part in important decisions about climate change.
Notes
1 See also Edward Page’s “identity dependence claim”: “the adop-
tion of the Depletion Policy is a remote, but necessary, condition 
of the Depletion People coming into existence and leading lives 
which are worth living” (Page 1999). 
2 Lukas Meyer (2003), makes a helpful comparison between 
the two worse off-notions, diachronic and a subjunctive-historical 
harm, showing why P2 (a version of the subjunctive-historical 
notion) seems preferable with regard to future generations. “A dia-
chronic notion of harm: Having acted in a certain way (or having 
refrained from acting in that way) at a time t1 we thereby harm 
someone if and only if we cause this person to be worse off at 
some later time t2 than the person was before we acted in this way, 
that is, before t1” (Meyer 2003: 148). 
“A subjunctive-historical notion of harm: Having acted in a cer-
tain way (or having refrained from acting in that way) at a time 
t1, we thereby harm someone only if we cause this person to be 
worse off at some later time t2 than the person would have been at 
t2 had we not [acted in this way] at all” (Meyer 2003: 148). I have 
exchanged “interacted with this person” for “acted in this way”. It 
is quite obvious why for our purposes we should avoid a diachron-
ic notion of harm. At the time before our act, which takes place 
at t1, future generations do not exist at all. We thus lack a point 
of reference that we may compare to the state of future people at 
t2, the time at which they experience the consequences of our act. 
Among these variants, then, a subjunctive-historical understand-
ing of harm will seem more adequate when dealing with future 
generations. If we accept the time-dependence claim, however, 
the subjunctive-historical notion of harm (simplified in P2) seems 
ineffective. G1’s act in the case of Depletion gives rise to G5 who 
would otherwise not exist. G5 will thus not be worse off with a 
deteriorated environment than they would otherwise have been. 
We are then unable to appeal to our notion of harm to account 
for the act as morally wrong.
3 Similarly, Page has referred to a “No Worse Off Claim”: “an 
act harms somebody only if it makes a particular person worse 
off than they would have been had the act not been performed” 
(Page 1999: 112).
4 Boonin expresses this differently: “If A’s act harms B, then A’s act 
makes B worse off than B would otherwise have been” (Boonin 
2014: 3). I find that formulation less pedagogical, as it is not as 
clear that the concept of harm is the definiendum (what is being 
Future persons are here unidentifiable not because it is 
difficult to know or see who they are, but because they 
still lack identities altogether. Therefore, their identities 




defined) while the notion of making somebody “worse off” is the 
definiens (what defines it).
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